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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
•oooOooo— 
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 
INC. , 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, INC., a California 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee, 
and INTERNATIONAL MACHINE & 
TOOL WORKS, INC., a Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 960120 
Priority No. 15 
•oooOooo— 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this 
case under Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2(3)j. This case was transferred 
to the Utah Court of Appeals under the pour over authority 
described in Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2(4) This court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Anno. §78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
All issues below were decided as a matter of law, and this 
court does not give deference to the lower court's rulings. BeruJbe 
v. Fashion Center, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033,1039 (Utah 1989) 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Does Utah's Tort Reform Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 et. 
seg. ) create a right for one defendant to have another co-
defendant's proportionate fault determined? 
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R. p. 192, 
1. 24-25 and NSI's memorandum p. 8) 
2. Are cross-claims "compulsory," and thus waived if not 
brought in a suit involving two co-defendants. 
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 202, 
1. 19-21 and NSI's memorandum p. 3) 
3. Does Utah's Tort Reform Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 et. 
seg. ) allow "reimbursement" to NSI of its settlement with the 
plaintiff Packer (for 100% of Packer's damages), to the extent co-
defendant Norton's fault caused these damages? 
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p.198, 
1. 1-7 and NSI's memorandum p. 8) 
4. Does res judicata bar NSI's claim for indemnity against 
Norton, when the claims were never litigated because of lack of 
standing. 
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p.218, 
1. 21-23 and NSI's memorandum p. 3) 
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5. In light of the legislature's intent under Utah Code Anno. 
§78-27-37, et. seq. , should this court follow other courts in 
adopting "comparative implied indemnity" in product liability 
cases, rather than pure "implied indemnity" which was adopted in 
Utah in Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P. 2d 443 (Ut. App. 
1988)? 
(Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 198, 
1. 13-16) 
6. Do the United States and Utah constitutions require that 
Norton's fault be determined at some point in the litigation 
process, and that notice be given NSI of when such claims must be 
brought? (Raised below: Summary Judgment hearing transcript (R p. 
205, 1. 13 - p. 206, 1. 12 and NSI memorandum at p. 6.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional Provisions 
The United States and Utah Constitutions demand that NSI be 
given an opportunity to have Norton's fault determined, and require 
that the statutes and rules set forth when and how that opportunity 
is available. Those constitutional provisions are: 
United States Constitution, 5th Amendment (Due Process): 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
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the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall 
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7 (Due Process): 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 11 (Open Courts): 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury-
done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Statutes 
The Utah Tort Reform Act (Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 to 43) 
requires that no defendant pay more than its proportionate share of 
fault and that the proportionate fault of each defendant be 
determined by the fact finder. See Addendum 1 for Utah Code Anno. 
§78-27-37 to 43. 
Rules 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states that cross-claims 
"may" be brought rather than "shall" as used in Rule 13 (a) on 
"compulsory counterclaims." Rule 13(f) reads: 
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(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state 
as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that 
is the subject-matter either of the original action or of 
a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that 
is the subject-matter of the original action. Such 
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against 
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-
claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the 
action against the cross-claimant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF CASE 
This is the second appeal involving these two parties. The 
first appeal is Packer v. National Service Industries, 909 P.2d 
1277 (Ut. App. 1996) (Addendum 2). 
Background of First Appeal 
The two parties to both these appeals were co-defendants in a 
suit filed by Sherman Packer who was functionally blinded in one 
eye when he opened a container manufactured by appellee Norton, and 
filled with soap by appellant NSI. The container was pressurized, 
and exploded, driving the seal which covered the pouring spout into 
Packer's eye. 
Plaintiff alleged that the container was negligently designed, 
and also unreasonably dangerous, since it would become pressurized 
when shipped from sea level to mountain regions like Salt Lake, and 
had no warning or means to release the pressure. The 
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pressurization occurred due to differences in atmospheric pressures 
which naturally differ with altitude, and will occur whether the 
container is filled with soap (as NSI used it), water, or even if 
it is empty. (Affidavit of plaintiff's expert Dr. de Nevers, R. p. 
149) 
In the first case involving these parties, appellee Norton 
moved for summary judgment against plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel 
was going to resist the motion and obtained an extension to 
respond. At the last moment, however, plaintiff's counsel decided 
not to respond, in part because ". . .it literally doesn't make 
any difference to me if it's both of those defendants at trial or 
one. I could have made an opposition, and maybe the outcome would 
be different" (R. p. 194, 1.16-19). 
Plaintiff's counsel realized that as long as the original 
judge granted summary judgment and refused to allow the other 
defendant to claim the dismissed defendant was liable, that 
plaintiff would still obtain 100% of his damages and yet the 
plaintiff would not have to contend with two cross-examinations, 
two opening arguments, two closings, etc. As only one product was 
involved, either defendant in the chain of distribution would be 
liable for the unreasonably dangerous product. 
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Upon hearing that plaintiff had suddenly decided not to resist 
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment, co-defendant NSI filed a 
quick opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, but argued 
that it had no obligation to do so. NSI argued that summary 
judgment should be granted, since it was not resisted by plaintiff, 
but that the fault should be determined by the jury since the 
dismissal was not "on the merits," but was because plaintiff had 
failed to resist the motion, much like a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute is not on the merits. 
The lower court in the first case heard NSI's arguments, but 
granted the summary judgment and ruled that Norton's fault would 
not be determined at trial. The result of the ruling was that NSI 
would pay Norton's proportionate share of fault, unless Norton's 
fault was later determined by another court. 
NSI later settled with plaintiff during court ordered 
settlement conferences. Plaintiff demanded 100% of his damages, 
fearing he could not appeal a summary judgment which he had not 
resisted, but agreed to cooperate with NSI in pursuing the claims 
against Norton. 
Disposition of Original Appeal 
NSI appealed the original court's grant of summary judgment. 
In the original action, neither Norton nor NSI filed cross-claims 
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against each other. The appellate court held that since no cross-
claim had been filed, there was no standing for NSI to dispute 
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment either in the lower court, or 
on appeal. For additional detail on the suit and appeal, see 
Addendum 3 (Course of Proceedings Underlying the First Appeal) and 
Addendum 4 (Statement of Facts Underlying the First Appeal) 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CASE 
Soon after the summary judgment, NSI sued Norton in the 
present case asserting a cause of action based on the cross-claims 
it could have filed in the original case, since Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13(f) makes cross-claims permissive, not being waived if 
brought at a later date. Those claims included negligent design in 
the manufacture of Norton's container, breach of warranty, strict 
liability, and indemnification, since NSI was a downstream 
manufacturer. 
The lower court in this case made its ruling before the 
appellate court ruled in the original case. The lower court here 
ruled that there is no cause of action to have a co-defendant's 
proportionate fault determined, and dismissed those claims for 
failure to state a cause of action. On NSI's indemnity claims, 
appellee Norton argued, and the lower court held, that the original 
court correctly granted standing to NSI, heard the arguments of 
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NSI, and ruled against NSI on the merit. The lower court thus 
determined that the doctrine of res judicata precluded the court 
from allowing the claims to be argued a second time. 
When the original appellate court later ruled, its ruling 
directly contradicted what the lower court here had anticipated. 
The appellate court ruled there was no standing in the first 
lawsuit to argue against Norton's summary judgment. NSI's claims 
have yet to be heard and decided by a court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. NSI filed a complaint requesting that Norton's"... 
percentage or proportion of fault..." be determined. (R. p. 003-4). 
2. The compliant had four causes of action, including: "Tort 
Reform Act, Proportionate Fault" (R. p. 003) ; "Negligence" (R. p. 
004); "Breach of Warranty" (R. p. 005); and "Strict Liability" (R. 
p. 006). 
3.The lower court Ruled "...as a matter of law that the first 
and second causes of action in the plaintiff's complaint fail to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted" (R. p. 
164)(Court's Order of Dismissal and Summary Judgment also reprinted 
in Addendum 5) because there is no claim to have a co-defendant's 
proportionate fault determined nor a claim for contribution. 
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4. The lower court granted summary judgment on the third and 
fourth causes of action as "... barred by res judicata doctrine..." 
(R. p. 165) since the prior "... Packer litigation resulted in a 
final judgment in favor of B. W. Norton ..." (R. p. 165), and since 
the "...issues have been determined in a final judgment on the 
merits in the Packer litigation" (R. p. 166). 
5. After the lower court ruled, the appellate court in the 
original case ruled that "...NSI was not a proper party to the 
motion for summary judgment brought by Norton, did not have a 
right...to oppose Norton's motion, and does not have a right to 
appeal the court's order that granted Norton's motion." (Packer v. 
National Service Industries, Inc., 909 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Utah App. 
1996)(Addendum 2). 
6. The appellate court held that "...NSI could have protected 
its potential claim against Norton by filing a cross-claim against 
Norton under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)." Id. 1278. 
7. The appellate court also held that "NSI could also protect 
a possible claim against Norton by filing an independent action 
claiming indemnity, if filing a cross-claim was considered to be 
tactically undesirable." Id. 1278. 
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8. The claims which the appellate court ruled could be filed, 
for Norton's proportionate fault to be determined and for 
indemnity, were dismissed by the lower court. (R. p. 164-6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37 CREATES A RIGHT FOR ONE 
DEFENDANT TO HAVE ANOTHER DEFENDANT'S FAULT DETERMINED. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in the previous case between these 
two parties, held that a cross-claim may be filed between two co-
defendants to have each defendant's proportionate fault determined. 
II. CROSS-CLAIMS ARE CLEARLY PERMISSIVE, NOT COMPULSORY. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states w [a] pleading may 
state as a cross-claim . . . ." The Federal Rule is the same, and 
Moores Federal Practice, Wright, Miller & Kane's Federal Practice 
and Procedure and case law confirm that "Cross-claims are always 
permissive" and " [a] party who decides not to bring his [cross-
claim] will not be barred . . . ." Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §1431. 
III. THE UTAH TORT REFORM ACT, UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37 
CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION TO HAVE A PARTY'S PROPORTIONATE FAULT 
DETERMINED AFTER SETTLEMENT WITH PLAINTIFF. 
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-44, et seq. specifically creates a 
cause of action for "reimbursement" which allows NSI to be 
11 
reimbursed for its settlement of 100% of plaintiff's damages, to 
the extent Norton's fault caused those damages. 
IV. NSI'S INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED 
BY A COURT AND RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THEM. 
NSI's indemnification claims have never been considered by a 
court, and the lower court erred in granting summary judgment based 
on res judicata. 
V. "COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THIS 
COURT TO REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
This court should adopt "comparative implied indemnity" in 
product cases, as other courts have done, in light of the Utah 
legislature's intent that no defendant pay more than its 
proportionate share. 
VI. THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS GUARANTEE THAT 
NSI MAY HAVE NORTON'S FAULT DETERMINED AT SOME POINT IN THE COURTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37, CREATES A RIGHT FOR ONE 
DEFENDANT TO HAVE ANOTHER DEFENDANT'S FAULT DETERMINED. 
In the previous appeal between these two parties, the 
appellate court ruled that NSI did not have a right to respond to 
Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment " [b]ecause NSI did not bring 
a cross-claim against Norton . . . ." Packer v National Service 
12 
Industries Inc., 909 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Ct. App. 1996)(Addendum 2). 
Nor could NSI "appeal the court's order that granted Norton's 
motion." Id. at 1279. In that opinion, the appellate court also 
stated that " . . . NSI could have protected its potential claim 
against Norton by filing a cross-claim against Norton under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f)." Id. at 1278. In this very case, 
the appellate court held that a cause of action, a cross-claim, 
exists between two defendants under the Utah Tort Reform Act. 
While the statute itself does not mention a cross-claim, 
judicial interpretation, in this very case, makes clear that such 
cross-claims exist to have a co-defendant's proportionate fault 
determined.1 
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 defines "defendant" as a person 
" . . . claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery." A "person seeking recovery" is ". . . seeking damages 
or reimbursement on its own behalf . . . ." Technically, one 
defendant does not seek damages from another defendant who is 
already joined as a party, but only seeks to assure the co-
defendant's proportionate fault is determined by the fact finder. 
Thus, a co-defendant is not, in the words of Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13(f), " . . . liable to the cross-claimant. . ." for a 
claim of damages, but is liable for that defendant's own 
proportionate share of fault. Wright, Miller & Kane §1431, p. 231 
maintain that a cross-claim that does not " . . . assert a plea for 
affirmative relief but merely alleges a complete defense . . . ," 
even though " . . . it intends the cross-claimant is completely 
blameless. . . does not raise any issue between the co-parties and 
is not properly assertable under the cross-claim provision." It 
should also be noted that Utah Code Anno. §78-27-41 allows one 
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There is then, clearly a cause of action to have a co-
defendant's proportionate fault determined. The lower court was 
incorrect in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. 
The next question is, when can such a cross-claim be brought. 
POINT II: CROSS-CLAIMS ARE CLEARLY PERMISSIVE, NOT COMPULSORY. 
A. The Utah Rule, Commentators, and Case Law Confirm Cross-claims 
Are Permissive and Can Be Brought in a Late Suit. 
The appellate court ruled that a cross-claim "could" have been 
filed. While "could" can be read in the past tense, the court 
never addressed "when" a cross-claim can be filed. The rules, 
commentators and cases all hold that a cross-claim is permissive, 
and can be brought either between two defendants in the original 
suit, or in a later suit, as was done here. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) states: "A pleading may 
state as a cross-claim . . . ." (emphasis added) 
The rule clearly states that cross-claims "may" be brought. 
This rule contrasts with Rule 13(a) which is entitled "Compulsory 
Counterclaims", and uses the word "shall" instead of "may". 
The Federal Rule and Utah's rule on cross-claims are the same, 
although Utah's is Rule 13(f) and the federal cross-claim rule is 
"defendant" to ". . . join as a defendant . . . " any other person 
who may have contributed to the damage, although "join" is referred 
to in the sense of adding a person not yet a party to the lawsuit. 
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13(g). Moore's Federal Practice confirms cross-claims are 
permissive, and may be pleaded later if the defendant so chooses. 
"The subdivision [on cross-claims], though reading much like 
subdivision (a) concerning compulsory counterclaim, is permissive; 
the claim may, but need not, be pleaded." Moore's Federal Practice 
2d 1Jl3.34[l]. (Emphasis in original). 
Wright, Miller, and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, 
§1431, also states this clear principle: 
Rule 13(g) [cross-claims], unlike Rule 13 (a) 
[counterclaims], always is permissive. A party who 
decides not to bring his claim under Rule 13(g) will not 
be barred by res judicata, waiver, or estoppel from 
asserting it in a later action, as he would if the claim 
were a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a)." 
(Emphasis added) 
Since a cross-claim is permissive, it is not waived if not 
filed in the original suit. Importantly, if there is no such 
independent cause of action to have a co-defendant's proportionate 
fault determined, there is no such cross-claim either. 
Although Rule 13(g) permits a party to assert, by way of 
cross-claim, a claim which could be asserted only in an 
independent action except for the authorization of 
subdivision (g) . the Rule does not affect substantive 
rights. . . . The cross-claimant must have a valid claim 
against his co-party. Whether he has such a claim is a 
substantive matter; whether he may assert it in a suit 
brought against him or his co-party or must bring an 
independent action is procedural. 
Moore's Federal Practice 2d 1|l3.37 (emphasis added). 
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Case law holds the same. 
Under both federal and Missouri law it is clear that 
cross-claims are merely permissive rather than 
compulsory. [cit. Omitted] Accordingly, a party to an 
action having a claim in the nature of a cross-claim has 
the option to pursue it in an independent action. 
Augustin v Mughal, 521 F.2d 1215 at 1216 (8th Cir 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
Since a cross-claim exists between two defendant's to have 
each others proportionate fault determined, the lower court erred 
in dismissing the complaint below. Since it was not brought in the 
original suit, it may be brought now. The lower court erred in 
dismissing that claim. 
There is no question that any cross-claim, including one under 
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37, et. seq. between co-defendants to have 
each other's fault determined is permissive. Since cross-claims 
are always permissive, the lower court erred in dismissing the 
suit, holding no such claim exists. The lower court made its 
ruling before the appellate opinion clarifying that a cross-claim 
exists. Thus, the lower court erred in dismissing the claim. 
NSI has a substantive right to sue Norton to have its 
proportionate fault determined. NSI can do so, procedurally, 
either in a separate suit or a cross-claim. If there is no such 
substantive cause of action, there is no cross-claim that could 
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have been filed as the appellate court held. The statute and the 
appellate court confirm such a right exists. Rule 13(f) makes 
clear the right is permissive and not waived if not brought in the 
original suit. Not aware of the appellate court ruling, the lower 
court erred in dismissing the suit. 
Court: If you tried to file a cross-claim in my court 
against a defendant who was either not named, or was 
named, for anything other than ensuring they were on the 
jury verdict for determination of responsibility, 
assuming there was some evidence they had some 
responsibility, I wouldn't allow it because you can't 
file a cross-claim for contribution. You can, under the 
statute, ask the court to include either a non-party, and 
if they are a co-party, they'll be in, if there's any 
evidence to have their fault evaluated. 
The lower court construed the claim as one for contribution, and 
was of the opinion that no claim exists between two co-defendants 
to have each other's proportionate fault determined. The original 
appellate opinion between these two Darties specifically allows 
bringing a cross-claim. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(f) makes 
clear cross-claims are permissive, and may be brought in a separate 
suit. Moore's, Wright, Miller and Kane and case law confirm the 
obvious. Cross-claims are, in Wright, Miller and Kane's words 
"always permissive," and "a party who decides to bring his claim 
under Rule 13(g) [Utah's 13(f)] will not be barred . . . ." 
Wriaht, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1431. 
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B. Policy Reasons Behind Permissive Cross-claims. 
Wright, Miller 5c Kane's Federal Practice and Procedure §4450, 
p. 424 discusses the considerations that n. . . are doubtless 
accountable for the general rule that cross-claims among co-parties 
are permissive, not mandatory." Among the considerations are that 
the co-defendants had no say in the choice of form, timing of the 
litigation, and u[m]ore important, the strategic impact of party 
alignment is quite different." Id. Several examples are given of 
defendant's incentives ". . . t o reduce the total extent of 
liability rather than adjust the claims of the defendants." Id. 
They acknowledge such concerns may be "mere irrationalities" but 
conclude xx[t]hey are vitally real nonetheless" and must serve as a 
basis of rules. 
There is no need to fear duplicate lawsuits, where co-
defendants have a trial against the plaintiff, obtain a verdict 
dividing their fault, and then sue each other a second time if they 
are displeased with the percentage of fault assigned them in the 
first trial. Established law of res judicata prevents duplicate 
litigation, not to mention the expense. But here the later filed 
cross-claim is allowed by the rules. Norton has not had its fault 
determined. There is no judgment on the merits as required by res 
judicata. 
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Cross-claims are clearly permissive, for good reason. The 
rule on cross-claims allow co-defendants who have an independent 
action, to bring the claim, if they desire, in the suit with the 
original plaintiff. The appellate court held such a cross-claim 
exists. The lower court has erred in dismissing the complaint for 
failure to state a claim. 
POINT III: THE UTAH TORT REFORM ACT, UTAH CODE ANNO. §78-27-37 
CREATES A CAUSE OF ACTION TO HAVE A PARTY'S 
PROPORTIONATE FAULT DETERMINED AFTER SETTLEMENT 
WITH PLAINTIFF. 
A second, independent reason une lower court erred in 
dismissing the claim to have Norton's proportionate fault 
determined is that the tort reform statute allows a settling party 
to sue for "reimbursement." Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37, states that 
w x
 Persons seeking recovery' means any person seeking damages or 
reimbursement on its own behalf. . . ." NSI is seeking 
ureimbursement on its own behalf" as specifically authorized by the 
statute. 
When Norton's original summary judgment was granted, Norton 
did not participate in several court ordered settlement 
conferences. Plaintiff was reasonable in his settlement demands, 
but insisted that the entire amount be paid by NSI, since Norton 
had received summary judgment. Plaintiff refused to appeal the 
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summary judgment he had not resisted, (even questioning his 
standing to do so since he had never resisted it) but offered to 
assist NSI in a trial against Norton if NSI would pay all of his 
damages. Plaintiff has now been made whole. 
NSI needs to have Norton's proportionate fault determined, so 
it can be "reimbursed" for that portion of Plaintiff's injuries 
caused by Norton. "Reimbursement", as used by the statute has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court, in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain, 
853 P.2d 877 at 881 (Utah 1993), to include employers and their 
insurance carriers, under the Worker's Compensation Act, as such 
persons seeking "reimbursement". Similarly, NSI is seeking 
reimbursement, as the act specifically authorizes. 
Courts have always encouraged settlement. Because Norton was 
granted summary judgment, it did not participate in the settlement 
conferences, nor in the settlement. The statute recognizes that a 
settling party should not be penalized. The statute authorizes NSI 
to sue for "reimbursement," allowing cases to settle, when not all 
parties are present. 
The tort reform statute's very purpose is " . . . to ensure 
that Nno defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any 
amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant'" Sullivan, supra, at 880 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §78-
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27-38) . The statute allows for unusual situations, such as this, 
by allowing a party to be "reimbursed" for a reasonable settlement. 
Again, the complaint states a cause of action. The lower court 
erred in dismissing it. 
POINT IV: NSI'S INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS HAVE NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED 
BY A COURT AND RES JUDICATA DOES NOT BAR THEM. 
Background of the Indemnity Claim. 
Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft, 758 P.2d 443 (Ut. App. 1988), 
held that, under certain circumstances, a upstream manufacturer in 
a strict liability case, must indemnify the downstream distributor 
not only for a judgment or settlement, but also attorney's fees and 
costs. Here, Norton manufactured the container, and included in 
its product, as delivered to NSI, the sharp-edged seal which struck 
Mr. Packer's eye. NSI made no alteration to the seal or container. 
NSI received the container, including the seal, put liquid in the 
container, precisely as intended by Norton, and sold the container 
to Mr. Packer. The Complaint stated a claim for indemnification. 
The breach of Warranty claim is similar). 
Summary Judgment Based on Res Judicata. 
The court acknowledged that the complaint stated a claim for 
indemnity, but granted summary judgment based on res judicata. The 
lower court stated: 
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In all candor [counsel] where Judge Brian [original lower 
court judge] entered a summary judgment where you were 
present and had the opportunity to be heard, and I don't 
buy into the argument that you don't, as a co-defendant 
in a nexus case, don't have standing, I just don't, I 
think you do, I think you have all the right to come down 
and squawk about summary judgment . . . ." 
R. p. 218, 1. 8-14 
"The doctrine of res judicata serves the important policy of 
preventing previously litigated issues from being relitigated." 
Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 279 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(Utah 1995) . Here however, the court of appeals ruled there was no 
standing, and the claims were never heard, no judgment was entered. 
Even if a judgment had been entered, the lower court would 
have to determine if there had been a "full and fair opportunity" 
to litigate the claims, since the parties were co-defendants, and 
may not press their claims against each other. "The rendition of a 
judgment in an action does not conclude parties to the action who 
are not adversaries under the pleadings as to their rights inter se 
upon matters which they did not litigate, or have an opportunity to 
litigate, between themselves." (quoting Restatement of Judgments 
§82 (1942)). The party barred from litigating a claim in a 
subsequent action must have had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the same claim in the prior case." Id. The same case 
concluded: "Silver Fork made no claims, litigated no issues, and 
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had no right of appeal against its co-plaintiff, Salt Lake City" 
Id., so it was not precluded from litigating the claims. 
Here, the merits were never considered, there is no final 
judgment on the merits. The lower court believed that the first 
appellate court would allow standing and decide, on the merits, if 
Norton had fault. In actuality, the court ruled that procedurally 
there was no standing, and there was no right to resist the 
original motion. Norton has never had its fault determined. Far 
from having the merits decided twice, Norton has yet to have its 
fault determined. The case should be remanded for trial on the 
merits of the indemnification claims. 
POINT V: "COMPARATIVE IMPLIED INDEMNITY" SHOULD BE ADOPTED BY THIS 
COURT TO REFLECT LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
The Utah Tort Reform Statute provides that NSI can sue Norton 
for its proportionate share of fault. However, if this court 
disagrees, this court should adopt "comparative implied indemnity" 
in product liability cases. Other courts, not having the benefit 
of a statute, have been faced with the intent of the legislature to 
have each party pay its proportionate share, and the inequity of 
implied indemnity in product liability cases, which requires a co-
defendant to be 100% free from fault in order to recover. The 
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original appellate court acknowledged NSI's right to sue Norton for 
indemnity. 
Implied indemnity in product liability cases was adopted in 
Hanover Ltd. v Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443 (UT Ct App 1988) . 
While implied indemnity as adopted in Hanover allows NSI to proceed 
against Norton, it has two inherent inequities. The first inequity 
is, of course, that pure implied indemnity is 'all or nothing'. 
A. Pure Implied Indemnity is Unfair and Violates Legislative 
Intent. 
If NSI is 1% liable, and Norton 99%, NSI receives nothing. 
This unfair result flies in the face of the legislature's intent in 
enacting comparative fault. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 
purpose of the Utah Tort Reform statute is u. . .to ensure that 
xno defendant is liable . . . in excess of the proportion of fault 
attributable to that defendant." Sullivan at 880. "Pure" implied 
indemnity violates the very intent of the Tort Reform Statute, by 
allowing a tort feasor who is 99% at fault, to pay absolutely 
nothing. Here, if NSI is only 1% at fault, it can pay 100% of the 
damages. 
When the Utah courts adopted pure implied indemnity, the Tort 
Reform Statute was not yet law. Now that the legislature has made 
clear that no party is liable in excess of its proportionate fault, 
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this court should adopt "comparative" implied indemnity to reflect 
the legislature's intent. Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37(2) 
specifically says that "fault," as used in the act, includes 
". . . strict liability, breach of . . . warranty of a product, 
[and] products liability . . . ." The legislature intended that no 
defendant in a product case pay more than its proportionate share. 
Numerous courts have realized this in equity, and adopted a 
version of "impled comparative indemnity". Kansas, New York and 
other courts have applied the fairness of comparative law by 
adopting "comparative" implied indemnity. 
In Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 618 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1980), 
the Supreme Court of Kansas recognized that w[t]he traditional 
implied indemnity . . . has been at best a 'blunt instrument' for 
reallocating loss." The Kansas court concluded that: 
A large and well-reasoned body of law in comparative 
negligence jurisdictions has determined that the concept 
of active/passive negligence has been extinguished by the 
introduction of comparative negligence. 
Kennedy, supra, at 8 00. The Kansas court noted that 
The [US] Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer held that the 
rule merely replaced one unfairness with another, and 
concluded that the responsibility for damages as between 
two wrongdoers should be determined by their relative 
percentages of fault. 
Kennedy, supra, at 801. 
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The Kansas court u. . . re-evaluat[ed] well-established 
common-law rules in light of recently adopted principles of 
comparative negligence," [Kennedy, supra, at 802.], and concluded 
that: 
When as here a settlement for plaintiffs' entire injuries 
or damages has been made by one tort feasor during the 
pendency of a comparative negligence action and a release 
of all liability has been given by the plaintiffs to all 
who may have contributed to said damages, apportionment 
of responsibility can then be pursued in the action among 
the tort feasors. 
Kennedy, supra, at 803. 
In this case, NSI settled all of plaintiff's claims, avoiding 
a very expensive trial (one expert had charged $29,000 without 
being deposed). NSI believes the settlement was favorable. Norton 
will share in NSI's favorable settlement, or if Norton can prove 
NSI settled rashly, Norton will pay a portion of a smaller verdict. 
B. Comparative Implied Indemnity Does Nothing to Alleviate the 
Unfairness in Negligence or Other Cases. 
Comparative implied indemnity cures the inequity of one 
defendant paying for another defendant's fault in product liability 
cases, but does nothing to cure that problem in negligence or other 
cases. This case involves claims of negligence, product liability 
and breach of warranty. 
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Implied indemnity, even when treated comparatively, only 
applies to product liability claims. There is no reason to allow 
comparative impled indemnity on the product liability claim, but no 
reimbursement on the negligence claim. NSI maintains that the 
better course for this court to take is to simply follow Utah Code 
Anno. §78-27-37 et seg. and allow reimbursement from Norton, 
proportionate to Norton's fault, because the statute creates a 
cause of action between co-defendants, as held by the previous 
appellate court. Utah Code Anno. §78-17-37 language provides for 
reimbursement due to all fault, not just product liability claims. 
This court, if it declines to allow NSI to proceed against 
Norton based on Norton's proportionate fault under Utah Code Anno. 
§78-17-37, et seq. should modernize Utah's implied indemnity 
referred to by the appellate court, and allow NSI to proceed with 
its indemnity claim based on comparative principles. 
POINT VI: THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS GUARANTEE THAT 
NSI MAY HAVE NORTON'S FAULT DETERMINED AT SOME POINT IN 
THE COURTS. 
A. Norton Argues That NSI Has No Current Claim Since It Did Not 
File A Cross-Claim. 
Norton must acknowledge that NSI has a constitutional right to 
have Norton's fault determined, but Norton claims that right was 
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waived when NSI did not file a permissive cross-claim in the first 
case. 
Norton has cited no law below that cross-claims are 
"compulsory" and has cited no reasons that 'compulsory' cross-
claims would be either fair or efficient. Norton has claimed that 
the courts are now powerless to determine its fault, since no 
cross-claim was filed in the original proceeding. 
Even if Norton were correct, that cross-claims were 
compulsory, notice must be given litigants of that fact. The rule 
on cross-claims does not give notice they are compulsory and are 
waived if not brought. The case law and commentators do not inform 
litigants that cross-claims are compulsory. In fact, the rule, the 
case law, the commentators all advise litigants that cross-claims 
are permissive, and by their very nature must state a cause of 
action that can be brought independently. This is why neither 
Norton or NSI filed cross-claims, and why such cross-claims were 
virtually unheard of before this case. 
Norton's claim of no remedy, if followed by this court, would 
result in the deprivation of constitutional rights, including a 
denial of due process (United States Constitution, 5th Amendment; 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7) , and the open courts 
provision in Article 1, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
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"The open courts provision guarantees 'access to the courts 
and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality,' 
and prevents arbitrary deprivation of 'effective remedies designed 
to protect basic individual rights.'11 Currier v. Holden, 862 P. 2d 
1357 (Ut. App. 1993) quoting Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670 (Ut. 1985). 
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
a meaningful way are the very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson 
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). Norton's fault must 
be determined, and the right to have it determined cannot be waived 
by failing to file a permissive cross-claim. Under the 
circumstances of this case, Norton's proportionate fault needs to 
be determined here, or due process and the open courts provision 
are violated. 
B. Summary. 
The essential question before this Court is whether cross-
claims are compulsory, and if not brought in a lawsuit between co-
defendants are forever waived. The answer is clear. The rules of 
civil procedure, both federal and Utah, have never made cross-
claims compulsory and there are a host of reasons for them not 
being compulsory. Usually, issues of cross-claims are resolved in 
the first suit. They would have been resolved in this case had the 
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plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment. Under unusual 
circumstances, as here, the cause of action underlying the cross-
claim, and the statute which specifically allows a suit for 
reimbursement, allow the defendant's proportionate fault to be 
determined. Principles of res judicata will prevent unnecessary 
re-litigation of the same issues. In this case, there is yet to be 
litigation of the cases issues. The complaint states a claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Norton was sued because a container it manufactured 
unquestionably injured a person. Norton may claim the pressure in 
the container was not related to the manufacturing process it 
conducted. But those are factual questions. To date, the first 
appellate court declined to decide on the facts because of a 
procedural issue, lack of standing. The second lower court, 
believing there was standing and that the appellate court would so 
rule, dismissed the case as having already been heard. Norton's 
fault has never been determined, and the constitutions of the 
United States and Utah provide that this injustice be remedied. 
The first appellate court ruled that a claim exists between 
co-defendants to have each others fault determined. The very basis 
of the Utah Tort Reform Act is to insure that one defendant does 
not pay another defendant's proportionate share of fault. The rule 
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and supporting authorities make clear that if a cause of action 
exists to bring a cross-claim, the same cause of action exists to 
bring an independent action. The rule on cross-claims governs only 
if that cause of action may be asserted in the earlier form that 
the plaintiff has chosen. Principles of res judicata will prevent 
duplicate litigation. 
NSI brought its cause of action in the lower court. That 
court did not yet have the advice of the first appellate court, and 
ruled inconsistently with the appellate court's decision. This 
court should remand this case for trial on the merits of the 
percentage of fault that Norton's container caused. 
DATED this / day of October, 1996. 
POWELL & LANG, LC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1996 I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Paul M. Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for the defendant/appellee 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Utah Code Anno. §78-27-37 to 43 
78-27-37. Definitions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person 
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liabil-
ity, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35, 
Chapter 1 or 2; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental em-
ployee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 30, Governmental Immunity Act 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seek-
ing damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on 
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 1994 
78-27-38. Comparative negl igence. 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defen-
dant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the 
fault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the 
person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made 
under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for 
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to 
that defendant under Section 78-27-39. 
(4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault attributable 
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when re-
quested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any 
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of 
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a 
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each 
person seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged 
injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is 
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the 
person seeking recovery and a defendant and may not 
subject the person immune from suit to any liability, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
78-27-39. Separate special verdicts on total damages 
and proportion of fault. 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if ary, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recovery, to each defendant, and to any person im-
mune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less than 
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or 
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage 
or proportion of fault to the other parties in proportion to 
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to 
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation, 
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons im-
mune from suit being allocated no fault. 
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or 
more, that percentage or proportion of fault attributed to 
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any 
reallocation under Subsection (2). 
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault attributed 
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of 
the person seeking recovery. 
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
fault — No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any 
other person. 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a 
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover 
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 
78-27-38. 1994 
78-27-41. Jo inder of defendants . 
(1) A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is a 
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than 
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contrib-
uted to the injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for 
the purpose of having determined their respective proportions 
of fault 
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a 
defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person immune 
from suit solely for the purpose of accurately'determining the 
fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant. A person 
immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a 
party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
regardless of whether or not money damages are sought. 
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an 
action may not be held liable for any fault allocated to that 
person under Section 78-27-38. 1994 
78-27-42. Release to one defendant does not discharge 
other defendants . 
A release given by a person seeking recovery to one or more 
defendants does not discharge any other defendant unless the 
release so provides. 1986 
78-27-43. Effect on immunity, exclusive remedy, in-
demnity, contribution. 
Nothing in Sections 73-27-37 through 78-27-42 affects or 
impairs any common law or statutory immunity from liability, 
including, but not limited to, governmental immunity as 
provided in Title 63, Chapter 30, and the exclusive remedy 
provisions of Title 35, Chapter 1. Nothing in Sections 78-27-37 
through 78-27-42 affects or impairs any right to indemnity or 
contribution arising from statute, contract, or agreement. 
1986 
ADDENDUM 2 
Packer v National Service Industries Inc., 
909 P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1996) 
PACKER v. NATIONAL SERVICE INDUS^ INC. 
Cite M 909 PJW 1277 (UuhApp. 1996) 
3. Judgment <&=>183 
Utah 1277 
Sherman D. PACKER, Plaintiff, 
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; 
Defendant and Appellant, 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, 
Inc., a California corporation; and In-
ternational Machine and Tool Works, 
Inc., an Illinois corporation, Defendants 
and Appellee. 
No. 950121-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 5, 1996. 
Plaintiff brought negligence action 
against manufacturer and user of container 
lids. Manufacturer moved for summary 
judgment which the District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Pat B. Brian, J., granted. Co-
defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Wilkins, J., held that user, as codefendant, 
did not have right to respond to summary 
judgment motion or appeal trial court's order 
granting motion. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Pleading e=*183 
In tort action involving multiple defen-
dants, when no cross-claim was brought be-
tween defendants, and when one of defen-
dants filed motion for summary judgment, 
co-defendant did not have right to respond to 
motion or appeal trial court's order granting 
motion; co-defendant could have protected 
its rights by filing cross-claim against other 
defendant or filing independent action claim-
ing indemnity. U.CA.1953, 78-27-43; Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 13(f). 
2. Pleading <s=>147 
Cross-claim may include claim that par-
ty against whom it is asserted is or may be 
liable to cross-claimant for all or part of 
claim asserted in action against cross-claim-
ant. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 13(f). 
In civil action involving multiple defen-
dants, when no cross-claim is brought be-
tween defendants, and when one of defen-
dants files motion for summary judgment, co-
defendant does not have right to respond to 
motion and, thus is barred from appealing 
trial court's ruling on summary judgment 
motion. 
Todd S. Winegar, Wade S. Winegar, and 
Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lant 
Paul M. Belnap and Robert L. Janicki, and 
Michael S. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellee. 
Before ORME, BENCH and WILKINS, 
JJ. 
WILKINS, Judge: 
Appellant National Service Industries, Inc. 
(NSI) appeals a grant of summary judgment 
entered in favor of appellee B.W. Norton 
Manufacturing Company (Norton). We dis-
miss the appeal. 
BACKGROUND 
Sherman Packer iiyured his eye while 
opening a container of Hi-Foam Degreaser 
sold to him by NSI. Packer alleged that his 
injury resulted when the pry-out seal on the 
container's lid struck his eye. As a result, 
Packer filed suit against NSI and Norton. 
Neither NSI nor Norton filed cross-claims 
against each other. NSI and Norton were 
merely co-defendants in a case brought by 
Packer. 
Norton had sold the pail and lid of the 
container that injured Packer to NSI, along 
with many other pails and lids. NSI was in 
the practice of placing bulk orders for these 
items with Norton. Norton manufactured 
the pails and lids, a process which included 
installing a pour spout with a pry-out seal 
made by another company into the lids, then 
shipped the pails and lids in bulk to NSI. 
Once NSI received the pails, it decided which 
of its products it would put into them, filled 
the pails with those products, and clamped 
the lids down. The container Packer was 
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opening when he was injured presumably 
had been through this process. 
Norton filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, which Packer announced he planned to 
oppose. However, at the last minute Packer 
decided not to respond to Norton's motion 
because he was "convinced there [was] no 
possible claim against Norton." Surprised 
that Packer was not opposing Norton's mo-
tion, NSI sought to oppose the motion for 
summary judgment. NSI filed a memoran-
dum and argued against Norton's motion in 
court, over Norton's objection. Neverthe-
less, the court granted the motion for sum-
mary judgment, by which Norton was dis-
missed from the action. NSI settled with 
Packer and now appeals the trial court's 
order that granted Norton's motion for sum-
mary judgment 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
We address a single question on appeal: 
May a co-defendant in multi-party litigation 
oppose the summary judgment motion of an-
other co-defendant brought against the plain-
tiff, when the co-defendant seeking to oppose 
the motion is not party to a cross-claim in-
volving the moving co-defendant? This is a 
question of law which we review for correct-
ness. See generally, Nixon v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
ANALYSIS 
[1] We dismiss NSI's appeal because we 
find that NSI was not a proper party to the 
motion for summary judgment brought by 
Norton, did not have a right under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to oppose Norton's 
motion, and does not have a right to appeal 
the court's order that granted Norton's mo-
tion. 
[2] NSI was brought into this case by 
Packer. When the court granted Norton's 
motion for summary judgment, thereby dis-
missing Norton from the suit, Norton's al-
leged fault could no longer be considered in 
Packer's case against NSI. See Sullivan v. 
Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 PJ2d 877, 878 
(Utah 1993) ("[A]n individual or entity dis-
missed from a case pursuant to an adjudica-
tion on the merits of the liability issue may 
not be included in the apportionment.*). 
However, NSI could have protected its po-
tential claim against Norton by filing a cross-
chum against Norton under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 13(f). "Such cross-claim 
may include a claim that the party against 
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the 
cross-claimant for all or part of a claim as-
serted in the action against the cross-claim-
ant." Yost ex rel Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 
1044, 1047 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). 
NSI could also protect a possible claim 
against Norton by filing an independent ac-
tion claiming indemnity, if filing a cross-claim 
was considered to be tactically undesirable. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43 (1992) (stat-
ing that specific recently-amended sections of 
the code do not "affect[] or impairf] any' 
right to indemnity . . . arising from statute, 
contract, or agreement"). 
Furthermore, because NSI did not have a 
right to respond to Norton's motion for sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff, NSI has 
no right to appeal the court's order granting 
Norton's motion. See Morrisorir-Kntidsen 
Co. v. CHG Intl Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1214 
(9th Cir.1987) (holding that co-defendant 
"may not appeal dismissal of additional de-
fendant from [plaintiffs] original claims, 
without itself being party-plaintiff to those 
claims," even though co-defendant's position 
may be affected by the resolution of plain-
tiffs claims against other defendant). 
[3] Therefore, we hold that in a civil ac-
tion involving multiple defendants, when no 
cross-claim is brought between the defen-
dants, and when one of the defendants files a 
motion for summary judgment, a co-defen-
dant does not have a right to respond to the 
motion. In addition, we hold that a co-defen-
dant barred from arguing against the first 
defendant's motion is also barred from ap-
pealing the trial court's ruling on the first 
defendant's motion. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, along with the Utah Code, pro-
vide ample ways for a defendant to squarely 
contest a co-defendant's argument or motion 
by bringing a cross-claim or a separate action 
against the co-defendant NSI should have 
followed one of these established, workable 
procedures. 
HORRELL v. UTAH FARM BUREAU INS. CO. 
Cite as 909 P.2d 1279 (UuhApp. 1996) 
Our holding on this issue disposes of the 1. Insurance <S>429.1(8) 
appeal. 
Utah 1279 
CONCLUSION 
Because NSI did not bring a cross-claim 
against Norton, NSI did not have a right to 
respond to Norton's motion for summary 
judgment or to appeal the court's order that 
granted Norton's motion. Dismissed. 
ORME, P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 2? 
Gregory S. HORRELL and Barbara 
Horrell, Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; and 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 950059-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 5, 1996. 
Insureds brought action against home-
owners' insurer to recover for alleged mis-
conduct in handling claim. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth 
Rigtrup, J., granted new trial on ground that 
prior trial erroneously required proof of ar-
son and misrepresentation by clear and con-
vincing evidence. Supreme Court granted 
petition for interlocutory appeal and turned 
case over to Court of Appeals. The Court of 
Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., held that: (1) 
as matter of first impression, standard of 
proof was preponderance of the evidence, not 
clear and convincing evidence, and (2) erro-
neous instruction requiring clear and con-
vincing was not harmless. 
Affirmed. 
Insurer's defenses of arson and misrep-
resentation must be proved by preponder-
ance of evidence, not clear and convincing 
evidence. 
2. Appeal and Error e=*1064.1(9) 
Erroneous instruction that homeowners1 
insurer was required to prove defenses of 
arson and misrepresentation by clear and 
convincing evidence was not harmless in ac-
tion by insured, even though jury found by 
preponderance of evidence that insureds'' 
claim was not fairly debatable; jurors were 
asked to consider all evidence and to deter-
mine whether clear and convincing evidence 
established arson, they were also asked to 
determine whether claim was fairly debata-
ble based on facts that were or should have 
been known when insurer denied claim, and 
jury thus could have concluded that claim 
was not fairly debatable when denied, but 
that subsequently obtained evidence would 
justify finding of arson by preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Keith W. Meade, Salt Lake City, for Ap-
pellants. 
Stephen G. Morgan and Cynthia K.C. 
Meyer, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before DAVIS, BILLINGS, and 
WILKINS, JJ. 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Gregory S. Horrell and Barbara Horrell 
challenge the trial court's order granting 
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company and 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's 
(collectively referred to as Farm Bureau) 
motion for a new trial. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Shortly before midnight on October 3, 
1990, the HorreU's residence caught fire. 
The fire was extinguished at approximately 
2:48 a.m., but rekindled within a couple 
hours. The house was ultimately destroyed. 
ADDENDUM 3 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS UNDERLYING THE FIRST APPEAL 
1. Appellee Norton moved for summary judgment against the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff obtained an extension of time to respond (R p. 
15, 1. 15-19) and told counsel for appellant NSI that he would 
respond (R pp. 15-16, 1. 25-2). 
2. Appellant NSI had not anticipated responding to Norton's 
motion for summary judgment. When plaintiff's counsel told counsel 
for NSI that plaintiff was not going to file a response, 
plaintiff's counsel said "whereupon, [counsel for NSI] had a small 
fit, and said he was going to file one. I said fine, go ahead. So, 
in fairness to [counsel for NSI] he did not know that [plaintiff] 
was not going to file a response, . . . until after [plaintiff's] 
response time was finished." (R pp. 15-16, 1. 242). Counsel for 
appellant NSI responded within several working days. (R p. 9, 1. 
22-24). 
3. At the summary judgment hearing appellee Norton argued that 
NSI's response was weeks late (since NSI did not request an 
extension, only the plaintiff did) (R p. 14, 1. 19-25). Appellee 
Norton argued co-defendant NSI's response should be ignored, 
leaving the court no alternative except to grant Norton's 
unresisted motion. (Norton's reply memorandum, p. 2; see also R p. 
24, 1. 7-14). 
4. NSI argued that it had no obligation to resist a 
codefendant's motion, and in fact, did not resist it as long as 
Norton's fault would be determined by the jury. (R p. 10, 1. 12; p. 
12, 1. 1-5) . 
5. NSI requested more time to build a case against Norton and 
respond to the summary judgment if the court held that NSI had an 
obligation to step into plaintiff's shoes and prove the plaintiff's 
case against Norton, or risk having the jury not determine Norton's 
fault. (R pp. 11-12, 1. 11-5; p. 23, 1. 611). 
6. Plaintiff's counsel maintained he was not obligated to file 
a response but that the Court " . . . has an obligation, under the 
rules, to decide the motion on the merits." (R p. 20, 1. 1824) An 
"on the merits ruling would prevent Norton from having its fault 
proportionately determined by the jury. 
7. With this unusual procedural position before it, the Court 
gave an "advisory opinion" and stated the Court was " . . . inclined 
to disregard the opposition to Norton's Motion for Summary Judgment 
filed by National Service Industry. And the reason being that it 
was not timely filed. . . . Therefore, the status of the record is 
that there is a Motion for Summary Judgment by the defendant 
Norton. The plaintiff has not responded And the Court is inclined 
to find that, based on the merits of the motion, that Norton is 
entitled to summary judgment." (R p. 24, 1. 7-14). 
8. NSI pointed out that the Court's advisory ruling would work 
a great injustice to ignore the merits of the motion yet grant the 
motion "on the merits." It would result in NSI paying for Norton's 
portion of fault. NSI also pointed out that codefendants seldom 
file responses to a co-defendant's motion for summary judgment, and 
that NSI had relied on plaintiff's counsel's representation that he 
would file a memorandum resisting the motion. (Rpp. 24-25, 1. 17-
5) . 
9. Plaintiff's counsel agreed it would be unfair to ignore 
NSI's brief, since he had made the representation he would file an 
opposition to the motion, and plaintiff's counsel urged the court 
to consider the motion on the merits. (R pp. 15-16, 1. 22-2) 
10. With this procedural scenario before him, the court 
reversed the advisory ruling and agreed to hear the motion 
on . . . the merits, or lack thereof." (R p. 29, 1. 13-18) 
11. The lower court heard argument on the merits of Norton's 
motion for summary judgment and granted it. The lower court ruled 
that Norton's fault would not be determined by the jury. The Court 
ruled that Norton owed no duty to warn plaintiff and that the 
product was not defective as a matter of law. 
12. NSI and plaintiff negotiated a settlement and release 
which compensated plaintiff for all of his damages, and plaintiff 
agreed to assign claims and assist NSI in seeking to have Norton's 
fault determined. Plaintiff dismissed his claims against NSI The 
lower court's summary judgment against plaintiff, thus became final 
and was appealed. 
ADDENDUM 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS UNDERLYING THE FIRST APPEAL 
1. The seal which injured plaintiff's eye, with the 
instruction "Pry Out" imprinted on it, was made by International. 
Norton purchased the seal and lid component from International and 
incorporated the seal into the top of Norton's pail. (Howard Norton 
depo. p. 50, 1. 16-22: p. 19, 1. 5-13) 
2. NSI received the container top, including the seal, as one 
unit, preassembled by Norton. (Howard Norton Depo. p. 19, 1. 8-13) . 
3. Plaintiff followed Norton's imprinted instructions by 
prying the seal off with his pocket knife. Plaintiff describes his 
accident: 
I read the instructions [NSI's] to see how much product 
I was going to need, and to see how to use the product. 
And at that point, I attempted to remove the lid so that 
I could pour out the amount of product that I needed to 
use to clean the engine off with. I unscrewed the cap. 
After, you know, unscrewing the cap, it had the safety 
seal, which was a little metal ring and embossed in it 
was the words, "Pry out," [International/Norton's 
instruction] with an arrow pointing down. At that point, 
I took my pocketknife out of my pocket, pried where it 
said to pry, heard an explosion, felt something 
instantaneously contact my eye, and felt pain. 
(Plaintiff's depo. pp. 35-36, 1. 16-1) 4. There was also a printed 
label of instructions attached to the container by NSI. The NSI 
label gave instructions on how to use the product itself. 
5. Norton holds itself out as a "leading supplier of shipping 
containers for the Western United States"; that their " . . . pails 
are manufactured to meet the standards of the Department of 
Transportation" and that "Norton Manufacturing is a major supplier 
for many industries including paint, petroleum, chemical, food, 
roofing, ag chem adhesives and ink." (Howard Norton depo. Exhibit 
1) The pail is normally used to ship liquids. (Norton depo. p. 33, 
1. 15-19) 
6. Mr. Norton knew of nothing that indicated the plaintiff did 
anything improper in removing the lid. (Howard Norton depo. pp. 51-
52, 1. 24-2) 
7. The seal's purpose is a "tamper proof seal." (Deposition of 
Norton employee Gerald Bettridge, p. 30, 1. 12) 
8. NSI filled the pail with soap, without any alteration of 
the seal, and crimped the top onto the pail. NSI then sold the pail 
and its ingredients to plaintiff. (R p. 3, 1. 18-19) 
9. Dr. Noel de Nevers, a professor of chemical engineering at 
the University of Utah Engineering Department, testified that the 
accident " . . . was caused by the inner seal piece being driven by 
gas pressure into the eye of the plaintiff" (de Nevers depo., p. 8, 
1. 14-20) . 
10. Dr. de Nevers thought that the pressure may have been 
created by chemical reactions in the NSI product, or perhaps by 
formation of Peroxides. Dr. de Nevers ran gas chromatograph and 
mass spectoptometry tests, and consulted with other experts. He 
concluded: 
Q. And the other possibility is some chemical reaction, 
but you've fairly well ruled that out. 
A. I can find no evidence to support it. That doesn't 
guarantee that it did not occur 
Q. But in your opinion, it did not occur? 
A. I believe it did not occur. 
(de Nevers Depo. p. 57, 1.13-18; see, also, p. 28, 1. 4-13; pp. 52-
53, 1. 9-9; p. 54, 1. 17-25; p. 57, 1. 13-18) 
11. Dr. Fineman, NSI's chemist, testified that the ingredients 
in NSI's soap cannot cause a pressure buildup. ". . . as a chemist, 
I have to respond by telling you that there's no basis whatever for 
any pressure buildup in this product." (Fineman depo. pp. 32-33, 1. 
23-4; p. 36, 1. 7-22) 
12. Dr. de Nevers eliminated any chemical reaction of the 
contents of the container as the cause of the accident. Rather than 
the contents causing pressure, plaintiff's expert testified that 
plaintiff's accident occurred because of pressurization due to: 
(a) Change in altitude. The product was packaged at sea 
level. When opened in Utah's higher altitude, the atmospheric 
pressure was less, making the container "pressurized" in 
relation to the outside air, independent of the container's 
contents; and 
(b) the product was packaged at a slightly lower 
temperature than the temperature when opened. Higher 
temperatures can create higher pressure inside the can. Dr. de 
Nevers was uncertain about the affect of temperature on the 
NSI can. 
ADDENDUM 5 
Order of Dismissal and Summary Judgment 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
NATIONAL SERVICE INDUSTRIES, : 
INC., ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
: AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
B.W. NORTON MANUFACTURING Civil No. 950900951 
COMPANY, INC., a California : 
corporation; and INTERNATIONAL Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
MACHINE & TOOL WORKS, INC., : 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
—oooOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the motion to dismiss of B.W. Norton 
Manufacturing Company, Inc. on September 1, 1995. The court having reviewed the memoranda 
submitted prior to that hearing and having considered oral argument of counsel presented at the 
hearing determined as a matter of law that the first and second causes of action in the plaintiffs 
Complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted since the causes of action in 
O 
n&. 
t&rbJ 
By 
substance requested relief by way of contribution from defendant Norton to the settlement made by 
the plaintiff to the plaintiff Sherman Packer in the Packer v. National Service Industries, Inc. et aL 
Civil No. 920902466 (hereinafter Packer litigation). 
The Court indicated it thought the third and fourth causes of action should be dismissed 
based on res judicata, but that it was not properly before the Court as a motion for summary 
judgment. Rather than force a refiling of a second similar motion, counsel for NSI agreed that the 
court could consider Norton's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on the third and 
fourth causes of action, with each party to submit an additional brief. 
Accordingly, the court considered the additional legal briefing submitted and reviewed the 
judgment from the Packer litigation and in that regard determined that the Packer litigation resulted 
in a final judgment in favor of B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc. (hereinafter Norton). 
On September 12,1994, the court in the Packer litigation entered a summary judgment order 
dismissing the claims of the plaintiff Packer brought against Norton. 
NSI had opposed the summary judgment of Norton in the Packer litigation and the court had 
considered the arguments of NSI. 
This court determines that the issues raised by NSI in the instant case are barred by res 
judicata doctrine as that principle had been established by appellate level courts in this state in cases 
including D'Astin v. Astin, 844 P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App. 1992), Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 
303, 305 (Utah 1985), and Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). 
2 
Accordingly, this court determines that claims one and two of the plaintiff fail to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted and further that claims three and four of the plaintiff are barred by 
res judicata in that the issues were litigated or could have been litigated in the Packer litigation 
between the same parties who are now before this court and said issues have been determined in a 
final judgment on the merits in the Packer litigation. 
For good cause appearing, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the motion to dismiss of Norton 
is granted and further, this court dismiss claims one and two of NSI as a matter of law, and grants 
summary judgment of claims three and four for the reasons stated above and also covered in this 
court's Minute Entry of October 16,1995, and therefore the claims of the plaintiff NSI are dismissed 
against the defendant B.W. Norton Manufacturing Company, Inc., with prejudice. 
DATED this £0 day ofWtfvombcr 199Sr« 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Todd S. Winegar 
Counsel for NSI 
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